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This Is the Family I Chose: Broadening 
Domestic Partnership Law to Include 
Polyamory 
 
By J. Boone Dryden1 
 
Relationships are a quintessential part of human existence. 
Relationships are broad in their meaning: friends, acquaintances, 
lovers, or family. While traditionally we have easily been able to 
define these things, more recently “family” has become a strange 
creature in the realm of relationships. So what is family? 
Tradition has defined family as a nuclear one, consisting of 
two monogamous, heterosexual adults—with or without children.2 
This traditional family has long been backed by the law in America.3 
Since the implementation of the no-fault divorce, the strength of the 
Feminist Movement, and the increasing number of states legalizing 
same-sex marriage, the “traditional” family must be reconsidered.4 
In doing so, the broader understanding of consensual partnerships 
that do not conform to the traditional family or relationship should 
be taken into consideration when discussing the extension of family-
like rights and status to individuals. One such consensual partnership 
is that of polyamory. 
Polyamory, much like monogamy, as a familial construct, 
values commitment, longevity, predictability, and the freedom of 
private intimacy. Just as traditional marriage is the vehicle for those 
desires, and rights under the Constitution as stated by the Supreme 
Court, for monogamy, so too should there be a vehicle for 
polyamory. While the majority of Americans pursue monogamous 
relationships of some form, “majoritorian legislation” should be 
                                                 
1 2016 JD/MFA candidate Hamline University School of Law. The author would 
like to thank the University for the Support and opportunity for this publication, 
his friends, family, and colleagues for support in such a charged topic, and his 
editors for offering intelligent and thoughtful critique to make for a well-
positioned article. 
2  See discussion infra Part I.A. 
3  See generally Mary Patricia Treuthart,  Adopting a More Realistic Definition of 
“Family”, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 91, n.7 (1991). 
4  See generally MARRIAGE PROPOSALS: QUESTIONING A LEGAL STATUS (Anita 
Bernstein, ed., 2006); see also WILLIAM J. O’DONNELL & DAVID A. JONES, THE 
LAW OF MARRIAGE AND MARITAL ALTERNATIVES (1982); oNANCY D. POLIKOFF, 
BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE 
LAW (2008). 
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“subject to a more nuanced and equitable analysis than before 
Lawrence [v. Texas].”5 
This “more nuanced and equitable analysis” ought to forward 
a discussion of how we as a society treat those who, in growing 
numbers, choose not to conform with the tradition of monogamy. It 
is important to understand the historical background of both bigamy 
and polyamory in this country. The last decade or more has seen a 
trend of refining our understanding of families and intimate 
association,6 and this, in conjunction with the backdrop of bigamy 
and the contemporary movement of polyamory, shape a discussion 
of how “family” is changing, and how the law should change to 
accommodate those in polyamorous (and other consensually non-
monogamous) relationships. An understanding of the history and 
current state of domestic partnership law will also be analyzed. 
 
I. Introduction 
A. Monogamy 
 
The American Heritage Dictionary defines monogamy as 
“the practice or condition of having a single sexual partner during a 
period of time.”7 Custom—or tradition—has also analogously 
defined family the same way as marriage, which is a “husband and 
wife (with or without children).”8 This sense that family and 
monogamy are equivalent has long been the social norm, and time 
and again the Supreme Court has upheld such a definition. 
Since the beginning of the 20th Century, however, American 
culture—as well as the court system—has refined its definition of 
family to include extended families, step families, adopted families, 
and many others. This refinement, further discussed in Part II of this 
article, has led to an inconsistent treatment in the law in equating 
family with monogamy, especially heterosexual monogamy. 
                                                 
5  Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 (D. Utah 2013) (emphasis 
added). 
6  See discussion infra Part II. 
7  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1137 (4th 
ed. 2000). 
8  MARRIAGE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, 42. 
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B. Bigamy 
 
This article will more fully discuss the history of bigamy (and 
more particularly polygamy in Fundamentalist Mormonism in Utah) 
in Part II.A.9 As a quick note, however, it should be pointed out that 
there is an inconsistent idea of what bigamy and/or polygamy is. 
Polygamy, as defined by The American Heritage Dictionary, is “the 
condition or practice of having more than one spouse at one time.”10 
It is, essentially, the antithesis of monogamy. In this country, 
however, polygamy has been associated heavily with polygyny, 
which is “the condition or practice of having more than one wife at 
one time.”11 This is due to the prominence—or perhaps notoriety—
of the Fundamental sect of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day 
Saints [hereinafter FLDS].12 Going forward the Brown court has 
given new guidance by giving a better working definition of bigamy 
as “the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible possession of two 
purportedly valid marriage licenses for the purpose of entering into 
more than one purportedly legal marriage.”13 
 
C. Polyamory 
 
Polyamory, which is the relationship in focus in this article, 
has been raised in the social consciousness, most especially in the 
last few decades.14 It has raised more than a few eyebrows from 
                                                 
9  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
10  THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1360 (4th 
ed. 2000). 
11 Id. at 1361 (emphasis added). 
12  See discussion infra Part II.A. 
13  Brown v. Buhman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1234 (D. Utah 2013). 
14  See, e.g., Elisabeth Sheff, Three Waves of Non-Monogamy: A Select History of 
Polyamory  in the United States, ELISABETHSHEFF.COM (Sept. 9, 2012),  
http://elisabethsheff.com/2012/09/09/three-waves-of-polyamory-a-select-history-
of-non-monogamy/ (stating that “polyamory ha[s] increased with the advent of 
Internet technology”). There have also been other media representations in 
television, books, magazine articles, websites, and other resources, such as in-
person community groups. See generally Franklin Veaux’s website, 
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traditionalists who cling to the notion that the one-man-one-woman 
relationship (bound in marriage) is the only successful and healthy 
pairing. Millions of dollars have even been spent in lobbying for anti-
gay or “pro-family” legislation or legislators who support such 
laws.15 This resistance might be vocal, but it seems to be an 
increasing minority, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 
decision to deny certiorari for the gay marriage ban appeals.16 
The term “polyamory” was first circulated in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s, being published originally as the word “poly-
amorous” by Morning Glory Zell-Ravenheart in her 1990 article, “A 
Boquet of Lovers.”17 At its core, it is the philosophy or practice of 
having multiple romantic partners. To those who actively seek other 
partners, that definition begins to fit them very particularly, with 
terms like “polyfidelity”, “mono-poly”, and even mixed marriage.18 
More broadly, and for the purposes of this article, the term 
“polyamory” is used to encompass all of those variations because of 
its consistent use among both practitioners and scholars.19 It is the 
consensual part that distinguishes it from distinctly from most 
                                                 
MORETHANTWO.COM, on the “Polyamory FAQ” page,  
http://www.morethantwo.com/polyamory.html, for more information about 
polyamory and other forms of consensual non-monogamy. 
15  See, e.g., Proposition 8: Who gave in the gay marriage battle?, L.A. Times, 
LATIMES.COM (Last visited Sept. 30, 2014), http://projects.latimes.com/prop8;  
See also 8: THE MORMON PROPOSITION (David v. Goliath Films 2010). 
16  Andrew Hamm, Afternoon round-up: Today’s orders in the same-sex marriage 
cases, SCOTUSBLOG.COM (Oct. 6, 2014, 5:09pm), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/10/afternoon-round-up-todays-orders-in-the-
same-sex-marriage-cases/#more-218623. 
17  Morning Glory Zell-Ravenheart, A Boquet of Lovers, GREEN EGG MAGAZINE 
(1990), at 4, available at http://www.paganicon.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/03/A-Boquet-of-Lovers.pdf. 
18  Maura I. Strassberg, The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering 
Polyamory, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 439, 444 (2003).  In the section of her article, 
entitled “I. What is Polyamory?” Strassberg goes to great lengths to define a variety 
of partnership options within polyamorous relationships, including those terms 
above. 
19  Amy Moors, et al., Consensual Non-monogamy: Table for More than Two, 
Please, THE INQUIZITIVE  MIND (Aug. 2014), http://www.in-
mind.org/article/consensual-non-monogamy-table-for-more-than-two-please. 
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polygamy, and the committed part that makes it more like the more 
modern definition of family.20 
 
D.  Distinction of Bigamy from Polyamory 
 
Polygamy, as is most common in the United States, is with 
the Fundamentalist followers of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints (FLDS or Mormons) and almost entirely those who live 
in Utah. Recently the practice has become more popular in the public 
eye with shows like “Big Love” and “Sister Wives”, thus adding to 
the confusion between or polygamy and polyamory.21 The FLDS 
practice includes non-state-sanctioned plural marriage, and there 
have been three Federal acts passed22 with language outlawing the 
practice in all 50 States and the U.S. Virgin Islands.23 It is the history 
of this movement and the public disdain of it that is relevant to the 
discussion of polyamory and the public opinion of it when it comes 
                                                 
20  See Edward M. Fernandes, The Swinging Paradigm: An Evaluation of the 
Marital and Sexual Satisfaction of Swingers, 12 ELECTRONIC J. HUM. SEXUALITY 
at 12 (Jan. 2009) (on file with author), availble at 
http://www.ejhs.org/Volume12/Swinging2.htm., for a discussion on swinging as 
having been in the dark corners of the American sexual understanding since the 
50s. Swinging is a behavior that involves consensual extra-marital sexual 
relationships; however, it falls within the realm of marital non-monogamy, if not 
marital infidelity. Largely driven by couples, statistics consistently show that most 
of them are “white, middle to upper class individuals in their late 30s, conventional 
in a social sense, community-oriented and responsible civic citizens who do not 
identify with specific religious organizations.”  “There is no seminal event” that 
marks the beginning of swinging, but it can be seen as rising out of the “Bohemian 
free love movement” and “took root especially in the popular Greenwich Village 
district of New York City between 1915 and 1925.”  Later, “[i]t was in [Air Force] 
pilot communities that the concept of sharing began,” and “it was common to find 
couples engaged in non-monogamous, casual sex interactions. 
21  Big Love (HBO television broadcast 2006-2011); Sister Wives (TLC broadcast 
2010-present). 
22  Bigamy in Territory (Morrill) Act, 12 STAT. 501 (1862); Bigamy (Edmunds) 
Act, 22 STAT. 30 (1882); Anti-polygamy (Edmunds-Tucker) Act, 24 STAT. 635 
(1887). 
23  Diane J. Klein, Plural Marriage and Community Property Law, 41 GOLDEN 
GATE U.L. REV. 33, app. (2010). 
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to extending rights to those who practice polyamory as opposed to 
polygamy. 
The popularity of “Sister Wives” sparked the Attorney 
General of Utah to threaten suit against Kory Brown, the show’s male 
focus, for violating both the bigamy and cohabitation sections of the 
Utah state code.24 The Browns later brought suit against then-
Attorney General, Gary Herbert, to enjoin the enforcement of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-7-101 (called the “Anti-Bigamy Statute).25 The final 
opinion in the Utah Supreme Court case, Brown v. Buhman, made 
the declaration that “neither participation in a religious ceremony nor 
cohabitation can plausibly be said to threaten marriage as a social or 
legal institution.”26 
With this decision in Brown, there is new direction for the 
difference between bigamy and polyamory. The court defined 
bigamy in the case as “the fraudulent or otherwise impermissible 
possession of two purportedly valid marriage licenses for the purpose 
of entering into more than one purportedly legal marriage.”27 The 
court, however, made clear in its opinion, that polyamory, or plural 
marriage, which was the term used in the case, was distinctly 
different.28 Citing State v Holm, the Utah Supreme Court states, “it 
is generally understood that the state is not entitled to criminally 
punish its citizens for making such a choice [of foregoing traditional 
marriage], even if they do so with multiple partners.”29 Such multiple 
partners allows for a broad understanding that legal marriages are 
very different from consensual cohabitation or romantic partnerships 
with more than one person, including those who enter into 
religiously-based plural marriage consensually. 
Polyamory, different from bigamy, is argued to have 
“relatively high levels of trust, honesty, intimacy, and satisfaction, as 
                                                 
24  See generally, Sister Wives supra note 21. 
25  Brown v. Herbert, 850 F. Supp. 2d 1240 (D. Utah 2012), aff’d, Brown v. 
Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
26  Id. at 1218. 
27  Id. at 1234. 
28  Cf.  id. 
29  Id. at 1219. 
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well as relatively low levels of jealousy in their relationships;”30 
whereas, “[c]ritics [of FLDS polygamy] rightly point to the physical, 
spiritual, and psychological abuse often associated with polygyny, 
including the taking of child brides.”31 So while the state’s legitimate 
interest might be in protecting minors, criminalizing abuse, and 
alleviating exploitation in a variety of ways, what it eventually 
amounts to is punishing those in polyamorous relationships who 
“intimately love more than one other adult.”32 Alternatively, critics 
of polyamory “argue that children are best cared for by one father 
and one mother”.33 It is a similar argument against same-sex 
parenting, which has met with equal opposition and successively 
more expansive adoption rights for these parents. In polyamorous 
relationships, “parents in polyamorous relationships appear to benefit 
from the proverb ‘it takes a village to raise a child.’”34 
 
II. Historical and Contemporary Background 
A.  History of Bigamy in the U. S. 
 
“The birth of polygamy in Utah can be traced to the visions 
of a twenty-four-year-old New York farmer named Joseph Smith.”35 
Smith’s visions and interpretation of the golden tablets led to the 
belief in a strongly Israelite notion of male dominance.36 This 
subsequently led to the “conclusion that the practice of polygamy 
was essential to what he called the ‘restitution of all things,’ and 
would become a principal tenet of the [Latter-Day Saints] faith.”37 
                                                 
30  Moors, supra note 19 at 3. 
31  D. Marisa Black, Beyond Child Bride Polygamy: Polyamory, Unique Familial 
Constructions, and the Law, 8 J. L. FAM. STUD. 497, 500, note 17 (2006). 
32  Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and 
Polyamorous Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). 
33  Moors, supra note 19 at 3 (emphasis in original). 
34  Id. 
35  Richard A. Vazquez, The Practice of Polygamy: Legitimate Free Exercise of 
Religion or Legitimate Public Menace? Revisiting Reynolds in Light of Modern 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 5 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 225, 227 
(2001/2002). 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
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By 1852, however, in light of a public announcement by the Mormon 
leaders in Utah Territory, “[c]lergymen, women’s leaders, and 
newspaper editors urged those in power to put an end to the 
practice.”38 In 1878 the country was given a public morality 
framework in the Reynolds v. United States, “which upheld a 
congressional criminal bigamy statute in the face of a Free Exercise 
challenge.”39 Since this decision, polygamy has been struck down in 
a variety of cases, both state and federal, with reference to Reynolds 
v. United States as their basis. This consistent tradition of anti-
polygamy can be seen as recently as 2003 with Lawrence.40  There is 
little doubt it will continue into the foreseeable future. 
Reynolds v. United States, decided in 1878, was the first case 
after the passing of the Bigamy in the Territories (Morrill) Act, which 
banned bigamy in areas such as Utah, that made a statement 
regarding bigamy, or polygamy as it was generally seen. The case 
was brought on appeal by Reynolds after he was convicted of bigamy 
for taking a second legal wife against the newly-passed law of the 
territories.41 Later, the Reynolds Court’s declaration that “it may 
safely be said there never has been a time in any State of the Union 
when polygamy has not been an offence against society, cognizable 
by the civil courts and punishable with more or less severity.”42 The 
very strong, anti-polygamy language can also be seen throughout the 
Reynolds opinion.43 This language has generally eroded, however, 
most notably in the recent Brown v. Buhman opinion, where the court 
rightly criticizes the Reynolds Court’s clear racism and 
discrimination toward polygamy.44 
 
B.  History of Polyamory in the U.S. 
 
                                                 
38  Id. 
39  Id. at 228. 
40  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating 
that bigamy was a justifiable law “based on moral choices.”). 
41  Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
42  Id. at 165. 
43  Id. at 161-166. 
44  See discussion infra Part II(C). 
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Elizabeth Sheff, author of the book The Polyamorists Next 
Door,45 succinctly describes in brief the history of polyamory as 
being divided “into three ‘waves’ occurring in the nineteenth, 
twentieth, and twenty-first centuries.”46 There were several in the 
mid- to late-1800s who practiced various forms of multi-partner 
lifestyles.47 In the 1960s and ‘70s, “[p]olyamory evolved as a direct 
result of the sexual revolution and intertwined with the alternative 
sexual forms . . . , especially the bisexual and free love 
movements.”48 This movement also gave rise to communes 
(including polyamorous communes, such as Kerista in San 
Francisco)49, as well as “group marriage and swinging.”50 Lastly, in 
the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, “the Internet has 
proved an especially important site for community building among 
marginalized populations” and “[s]exual non-conformists have 
populated the Internet in droves, forming personal and sexual 
connections online.”51 This ability to make connections across the 
country, as well as worldwide, has “provid[ed] polys with a 
convenient way to create community, give each other advice, and 
find partners.”52 “[T]he Internet has also significantly impacted how 
poly’s [sic] interact with other sexual minorities”53 and has allowed 
for alliances with many bisexual and transexual communities for 
their marginalization, even from the LGBT community, as well as 
their almost intrinsic connection with multiple-partner relationships. 
The article makes note that the term “plural marriage” should 
also be included in this discussion of polyamory, because it is more 
generally the case that such relationships are consensual and distinct 
                                                 
45 ELISABETH SHEFF, THE POLYAMORISTS NEXT DOOR: INSIDE MULTIPLE-
PARTNER RELATIONSHIPS AND FAMILIES (2013). 
46  Sheff, supra note 14 at ¶ 1. 
47  Id. at ¶ 2 
48  Id. at ¶ 5. 
49  Kerista was a “proto-polyamorous intentional community based in the San 
Francisco Bay Area between 1971 and 1991. Approximately 25 adults lived either 
in separate group marriages or in a single group marriage. See id. at ¶¶ 10-11. 
50  Id. at ¶¶ 7, 10; see Fernandes, supra note 20. 
51  Sheff, supra note 14 at ¶ 14. 
52  Id. at ¶ 15. 
53  See id. 
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from bigamy.54 Similarly, the Brown v. Buhman case that drives 
much of this discussion involved a man with four consensually 
entered-into relationships with separate women, only one of whom 
was legally his wife.55 
 
II. The Evolution of the Traditional Family 
 
Monogamy, as a tradition, has been in decline in the last 
decades, at least through the institution of marriage.56 Similarly, 
unmarried partners are marrying later in life or choosing not to marry 
at all.57 To degrade the tradition of marriage more, the rate of 
divorces has steadily increased since World War II, even more 
dramatically since the 1970’s and the introduction of the no-fault 
divorce.58 The idea of marriage does not conform now to what it did 
two decades ago: same-sex marriage is now allowed throughout 
many states in the country and others have overturned constitutional 
bans;59 45 years ago, interracial marriage was made legal.60 We have 
continued to redefine marriage over the course of time, just as we 
continue to define relationships and the rights and privileges afforded 
them. 
 
Polyamory as “family” 
 
In 1973, as more traditional families were divorcing and the 
no-fault divorce was on the horizon, the American Home Economics 
Association offered a new definition of family that better reflected 
                                                 
54  See discussion infra Part II(C). 
55  See Sister Wives infra note 20. 
56  Allen M. Parkman, The Contractual Alternative to Marriage, 32 N. KY. L. 
REV. 125, n. 6 (2005). 
57  Katherine C. Gordon, The Necessity and Enforcement of Cohabitation 
Agreements: When Strings Will Attach and How to Prevent Them, A State Survey, 
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 245 (1998). 
58  Parkman,  supra note 56, at 125,  n.7. 
59  Marriage Equality & Other Relationship Recognition Laws, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN (Oct. 2014), http://hrc-assets.s3-website-us-east-
1.amazonaws.COM//files/assets/resources/marriage-equality_10-2014.pdf. 
60  Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
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this changing American landscape. The defined a family as “two or 
more people who share resources, share responsibility for decisions, 
share values and goals, and have commitments to one another over 
time. The family is a climate that one ‘comes home to’ and it is this 
network of sharing and commitments that most accurately describes 
the family unit, regardless of blood, legal ties, adoption or 
marriage.”61 As more and more Generation-X and Millennial adults 
choose not to marry but still create their own new families consisting 
of partners, children, and families, this 40-year-old definition seems 
even more appropriate today. 
It is this sense of family that those in polyamorous 
relationships have grasped. The idea of crafting one’s own family 
from consensual partnerships (whether monogamous or 
polyamorous) based on love and commitment seems to embrace the 
very heart of family in this country. Polyamory easily fits within this 
definition of family and follows a trend in the courts, who have 
consistently found that family is not limited to one man and one 
woman.62 Similarly, the ALI’s Principles of the Law pf Family 
Dissolution provide an extensive and non-exclusive list of 
circumstances that go toward determining whether a domestic 
partnership has been established.63 Many of these elements are 
foundational in maintaining long-term polyamorous relationships, 
just as they are in monogamous partnerships. 
 
IV. Cases Bearing on the Discussion 
 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, Lawrence v. Texas, Brown v. 
Buhman, and other cases all highlight the Supreme Court’s desire to 
                                                 
61 NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW 33 (2008). 
62 See generally United States v. Windsor (stating that Section 3 of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA) (which stated that marriage is between a man and a woman) 
is unconstitutional); see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (holding that family 
includes non-immediate family members); see also Braschi v. Stahl Associates 
Co., (holding that “the term family . . . was not to be rigidly restricted to those 
people who had formalized their relationship”). 
63 See generally Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution § 6.03 (2002). 
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“[p]rotect[] [intimate] relationships from unwarranted state 
interference” and the “ability independently to define one’s 
identity,”64 and it should be recognized that relationships and our 
autonomous ability to privately form our intimate connections should 
trump what others consider morally unacceptable. 
 
1. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees 
 
Decided in 1984, Roberts was a suit brought by the 
Minnesota Commissioner for the Department of Human Rights 
against the United States Jaycees, a fraternal organization for 
businessmen in the U.S.65 The appeal by the Jaycees to the Supreme 
Court was based on the decision of the lower court requiring the U.S. 
Jaycees to admit women as full members was a violation of both their 
First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.66 The Court’s decision was 
to reverse the Eighth Circuit’s decision, “conclud[ing] that choices 
to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships must 
be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of 
such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is 
central to our constitutional scheme.”67 
 
2. Romer v. Evans 
 
In 1992, Colorado adopted a referendum that repealed city 
ordinances that prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation.68 The suit was brought against the State as violating, 
among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
Constitution.69 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this decision with 
Kennedy’s restatement of Justice Harlan’s famous words that “the 
                                                 
64  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984); accord Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Brown v.Buhnam, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 
2013). 
65  Roberts, 468 U.S. at 616. 
66  Id. at 617-618. 
67  Id. 
68  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (U.S. 1996). 
69  Id. at 625. 
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Constitution ‘neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.’”70 
Similar to the language later used in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, Romer 
concluded that “[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more 
difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from 
the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws in the 
most literal sense.”71 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Romer is strikingly similar to that 
in Lawrence discussed below. In Romer, he looked to statutes in a 
number of U.S. states that ban the practice of polygamy, one of the 
things that ought to be banned, in his opinion, to “preserve [a state’s] 
view of sexual morality,”72 which was the issue in contention, in his 
view, in Romer v. Evans. He states that these statutes are in question 
because “[t]he Court’s disposition today suggests that these 
provisions are unconstitutional, and that polygamy must be permitted 
in these States on a state-legislated . . . basis—unless, of course, 
polygamists for some reason have fewer constitutional rights than 
homosexuals.”73 Arguably, no one should have fewer rights than 
anyone else, as the Romer Court declares, and thus Scalia’s words 
should ring true—polygamists (or those who practice non-bigamous 
plural marriage or polyamory) deserve those same rights as  
homosexuals, at minimum to the extent to which those citizens are 
provided rights under domestic partnership. 
 
3. Lawrence v. Texas 
 
In 2003, the U.S. Supreme Court found that “[l]iberty protects 
the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling 
or other private places,” and that “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of 
self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain 
intimate conduct.”74 After having been arrested and fined for 
“deviate sexual intercourse” (commonly referred to as sodomy) 
under the Texas Penal Code, two men sued the state of Texas for 
                                                 
70  Id. at 623. 
71  Id. at 633. 
72  Id. at 648. 
73  Id. 
74  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
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violating their right to privacy.75 The Court determined that “[m]oral 
disapproval of a group cannot be a legitimate government interest . . 
. because legal classifications must not be ‘drawn for the purpose of 
disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.’”76 
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence is, again, particularly 
relevant in our discussion.77 In it he argues that “[c]ountless judicial 
decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient 
proposition that a governing majority’s belief that certain sexual 
behavior is ‘immoral and unacceptable’ constitutes a rational basis 
for regulation.”78 Such an argument does not seem justified if 
Roberts or Romer are to be followed; indeed, simply stating that 
tradition is the answer does not make that tradition one worthy of 
continuation. Scalia uses polygamy as an example of his very 
common slippery slope argument, stating that “[s]tate laws against 
bigamy, same-sex marriage . . . adultery, [and] fornication . . . are 
likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based 
on moral choices.”79 
 
4. Perry v. Schwarzenegger 
 
This case is meant to highlight the debate that raged in 
California over same-sex marriage and domestic partnership laws.80 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger (later Perry v. Brown), stands for the notion 
that “domestic partnerships are distinct from marriage and do not 
provide the same social meaning as marriage.”81 This idea becomes 
important when discussing the expansion of the current domestic 
partnership laws to include polyamorous relationships, because it is 
not marriage that is being argued for but the “fundamental liberty 
interest in choosing to cohabit and maintain romantic . . . 
relationships, even if those relationships are termed ‘plural marriage’ 
                                                 
75  Id.; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (West 2003). 
76  Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583. 
77  See id. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
78  Id. at 589. 
79  Id. at 590. 
80  See discussion infra Part III. 
81  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
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[or polyamory].”82 The court in California determined that 
Proposition 8 was unconstituational because it proposed a 
“significant symbolic disparity between domestic partnership and 
marriage” and “fail[ed] to advance any rational basis for singling out 
gay men and lesbians for denial of a marriage license.”83 Lastly, the 
court makes a strong statement by saying “[t]he evidence shows that 
the movement of marriage away from a gendered institution and 
toward and institution free from state-mandated gender roles reflects 
an evolution in the understanding of gender rather than a change in 
marriage.”84 It is arguably a statement on the evolution of our 
understanding, as a society and legally, of relationships and 
relationship structures85 and further evidences that 1) marriage does 
not equal family, and 2) family is an evolved concept. 
 
5. Marvin v. Marvin 
 
In discussing cohabitation agreements, which a vital part of 
this article’s discussion,86 Marvin was a case brought by Michelle 
Marvin against Lee Marvin for the enforcement of a cohabitation 
agreement signed in 1964.87 While the court held that the Marvins’ 
agreement was void due to meretricious consideration, it held that 
“courts should enforce express contracts between nonmarital 
partners except to the extent that the contract is explicitly founded on 
the consideration of meretricious sexual services.”88 
While later courts have been split on the issue, it should be 
noted that California’s law is still valid, and other states have 
followed its decision.89 This ability to protect rights, propery, and 
benefits through contract, enabling partners to define family non-
                                                 
82 Brown v.Buhnam, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1198 (D. Utah 2013). 
83  Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1003. 
84  Id. at 993 (emphasis added). 
85  See discussion supra Part II(B) 
86  See discussion infra Part III(B). 
87  Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 110 (Cal. 1976). 
88  Id. at 109 (implying the definition of meretricious as being a purely sexual 
arrangement with no other consideration). 
89  See discussion infra Part III. 
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traditionally, is again proof that marriage does not equal family: 
family is what we make of it ourselves, and that ability is what is and 
should be protected by the language of these cases. 
 
V. Origin of Rights for Polyamory 
 
In 2012, “[a] recent poll by Loving More magazine found that 
nearly two-thirds of [polyamorous individuals] would seek legal 
recognition if they could.”90 Practitioners of polyamorous 
relationships might not necessarily desire marriage, as defined by 
most courts, but the rights and protections afforded those who wish 
to choose domestic partnerships (both same- and opposite-sex) are 
well within the desired legal protections. “Domestic partnership[s] . 
. . ha[ve] tremendous possibility to create a more expansive version 
of what a relationship can look like.”91 
As the definition of relationships, including marriage, have 
changed, so too must the laws that protect them. As Roberts lays out, 
our ability in America “to enter into and maintain certain intimate 
human relationships must be secured against undue intrusion by the 
State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the 
individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme.”92 
Such intimate associations would be relevant to polyamory 
relationships because “people can exhibit aspects of attachment 
                                                 
90  Michael Cook, Will Polyamory Follow Same-sex Marriage?, 
LIFESITENEWS.COM, Aug. 7, 2013, https://www.lifesitenews.com/opinion/will-
polyamory-follow-same-sex-marriage (citing a survey conducted by Loving More 
and the National Coalition for Sexual Freedom of 4000 participants between Feb. 
and Aug. 2012, the results of which can be found at 
http://www.lovemore.com/polyamory-research/2012-lovingmore-polyamory-
survey/ ). 
91  Laura Essig,., Is It Time to Institutionalize Polyamorous Relationships?, 
PSYCHOLOGYTODAY.COM, (Feb. 24, 2014)  
http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/love-inc/201402/is-it-time-
institutionalize-polyamorous-relationships; see also Roc Morin, Up for 
Polyamory? Creating Alternatives to Marriage, THEATLANTIC.COM (Feb. 14, 
2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2014/02/up-for-polyamory-
creating-alternatives-to-marriage/283920/2/. 
92  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). 
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security (i.e., low levels of avoidance) without being sexually 
exclusive.”93 As well, “people in polyamory relationships are lower 
in avoidance.”94 In other words, people in polyamory relationships 
have clearly learned to be in relationships in which they “are 
committed to one another to the same extent as married partners,”95 
the center-piece of all domestic partnership law today. 
Like the Minneapolis statute discussed later, domestic 
partnership statutes have similar language directing those entering 
into the arrangement to be “committed adult partners.”96 To date the 
general legal standing is that multiple-partner relationships cannot 
meet the requirement of the domestic partnership statute because 
those statutes universally require only two parties.97 Psychologists 
believe that “polyamorous relationships can be viable and successful 
alternatives to more traditional concepts of monogamy,”98 and this 
viability should be afforded reasonable recognition and protections. 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees puts forth the broad freedom of 
private association that was applied in Lawrence v. Texas and later 
followed in Brown v. Buhman.99Not only is this freedom essential, 
but the argument put forth in Elizabeth Lesher’s article would further 
support both a contractual and Substantive Due Process right, which 
this article concurs with while expanding on it, for polyamorous 
relationships to be legally recognized through domestic 
partnerships.100 
 
1. Rights by Contract 
 
                                                 
93  Moors, supra note 19 at 2 (defining “avoidance” as those who avoid 
commitment in relationships). 
94  Id. 
95  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20 (2014) 
96  Id.; see also Essig, supra note 91. 
97 MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20. 
98  Moors, supra note 19 at 3. 
99  See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) 
100  See Elizabeth Cannon Lesher, Protecting Poly: Applying the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Nonmonogamous, 22 TUL. J. L. & SEXUALITY 127 (2013). 
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The American court system has a history of respecting and 
defending an individual’s right to contract privately with whom they 
wish. Business law is robust and filled with private contract 
protections; marital and family law respects both pre-nuptial and 
post-nuptial agreements regularly; and, more recently, courts have 
begun to more consistently uphold cohabitation agreements.101 
A solid argument has also been made for using cohabitation 
agreements for two-person, non-married partners.102 These contracts, 
or cohabitation agreements, “will generally be enforced in the same 
manner as a “pre-nup” or “post-nup” is enforced in the state where 
the agreement is executed.”103 The rights and privileges that are 
afforded with these agreements can be fairly broad, including 
distribution of real estate, income, pensions, and personal 
property.104 With the increase in both divorces and unmarried 
partners, “[i]t seems to be a logical time to reconsider whether 
marriage is the best institution for establishing long-term 
relationships or whether there are alternatives to it that will increase 
social welfare.”105 While some courts have argued that domestic 
partnerships are not contracts with the State106 like marriages are, it 
can be argued to the contrary. 
As it was with domestic partnership laws, California was one 
of the first to recognize the validity of cohabitation agreements for 
                                                 
101  See National Paralegal College, Cohabitation Agreements, 
NATIONALPARALEGAL.EDU, 
http://nationalparalegal.edu/public_documents/courseware_asp_files/domesticRel
ations/ContractsMarraige/CohabitationAgreements.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 
2014)(stating “approximately 30 states recognize express agreements between 
unmarried cohabitants.”). 
102  See Jeanne M. Hannah, The Law and Living Together, ABA.ORG(Fall 2010) 
http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/law_trends_news_practice_a
rea_e_newsletter_home/fl_feat3.html. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Parkman, supra note 56 at 126. 
106  Appling v. Walker, 2014 WI 96, ¶ 43, 2014 Wisc. Lexis 533, *37 (Wis. 2014) 
(stating that “[a domestic partnership] does not identify the legal status as a 
contractual relationship.”). 
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unmarried partners in Marvin v. Marvin.107 While courts across the 
country are split on the definition of “meretricious” from the Marvin 
case, there is still a strong favoring of private contract between 
parties, even if those parties are unmarried and sharing financial 
obligations.108 Minnesota, for example, has two cases in which the 
court lays out the considerations the parties must have when entering 
into such cohabitation agreements.109 Section 513.075 of the state 
code lays out the rights and obligations of parties wishing to have an 
enforceable cohabitation agreement.110 In comparison the 
Minneapolis Ordinance, Sec. 142.20, has language that is analogous 
to that in Sec. 513.075: subsection (a)(5) of the Minneapolis 
Ordinance states that partners “[a]re jointly responsible to each other 
for the necessities of life;” while subsection (a)(6) states that they 
“[a]re committed to one another to the same extent as married 
persons are to each other.”111 Lastly, a domestic partnership requires 
that parties “[a]re competent to enter into a contract.”112 If a domestic 
partnership requires that parties be competent to enter into a contract, 
then it seems counter to argue that domestic partnerships are not 
contracts. 
If this is the case, then a polyamorous relationship should be 
capable of signing multiple such contracts with their other partners, 
just as a businessperson, with proper consideration for each contract, 
is capable of entering into multiple agreements with others.  An 
individual’s private right to contract, as evidenced in the 
enforceability of contracts that specifically contemplate sexual 
                                                 
107  See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).denying the enforceability of 
the contract between the Marvins but stating that “[t]he courts should enforce 
express contracts between nonmarital partners except to the extent that the contract 
is explicitly founded on the consideration of meretricious sexual services.”). 
108  Id. 
109  See generally Estate of Peterson, 579 N.W.2d 488 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010); see 
also In re Estate of Leslie, 2010 Minn. App. Unpub. Lexis 958 (Minn. Ct. App. 
2010). 
110  See MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (2014). 
111  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 142.20(a)(5)-(6)(2014). 
112  Id. § 142.20(a)(3). 
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relations between two parties,113 should be protected, and 
polyamorous relationships should be able to “choose to enter upon 
[their] relationship[s] in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”114 
 
2. Rights by Substantive Due Process 
 
“Both polyamory and religious polygamy present a range of 
issues for substantive due process, such as freedom of intimate 
association, freedom of religion, and the right to privacy.”115 In light 
of the decision in Brown v. Buhman, “the right to engage in private 
non-mongamous activity would be more useful to form an argument 
that any future government discrimination in custody decisions or 
employment of a polygamous or [polyamorous] person is a violation 
of his or her fundamental liberty, analogous to the right to be free 
from government intrusion on private intimate conduct in Lawrence 
[v. Texas].”116 The Pennsylvania Superior Court has spoken to this 
very concern in V.B. v. J.E.B., stating that “the trial court’s 
observation that polyamory was unworkable in [a child custody] 
situation was irrelevant” and “fails to support its concomitant 
conclusion that the unorthodox lifestyle was detrimental to the 
children in this case.”117 If this court has decided, even in dictum, 
that polyamory has no place in determining a parent’s capacity, it 
should equally have no place in deciding whether or not it fits within 
the definition of family. 
While there is little case law that directly speaks to 
polyamory, domestic partnerships and cohabitation agreements both 
speak to the notion of sexual relationships and familial relationships, 
and “such intimate human relationships must be secured against 
undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships 
                                                 
113  See MINN. STAT. § 513.075 (stating that cohabitation agreements are in 
contemplation of a sexual relationship). 
114  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). 
115  Lesher, supra note 100 at 130 n.132. 
116  Id. at 138. 
117  V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012). 
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in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our 
constitutional scheme.”118 
 
VI. Domestic Partnership & Family 
 
Beginning with the passage of the “California Domestic 
Partner Rights and Responsibilities Act of 2003,” permitting 
domestic partnerships in California, more than half of the States have 
passed similar bills.119 The rise of the domestic partnership law came 
in response to a growing number of cases regarding privileges and 
rights for insurance benefits and hospital visitation, as well as other 
privileges afforded those in traditional families. The first use of the 
term was in Brinkin v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., in which 
Brinkin requested to be compensated for funeral leave for his same-
sex partner but lost and was later denied appeal.120 This suit pushed 
many gay-rights activists to demand more protection as well as 
rights. Domestic partnerships, even in their humble beginnings, 
provided rights to hospital visits and medical proxy. As they have 
become more common throughout the country, the rights have been 
expanded to include a variety of rights.121 
Domestic partnerships in the last decade have been evolving 
legally in similar ways that marriage has. In California especially, 
there has been a fluctuation with the original bill “Proposition 22”, 
which was overturned in 2004; the passing of “Proposition 8” in 
2008; and then finally the overturning of that law in Perry v. 
                                                 
118  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984). 
119  Civil Unions & Domestic Partnership Statutes, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/civil-unions-
and-domestic-partnership-statutes.aspx (last updated Nov. 2014). 
120  Brinkin v. S. Pac.Transp. Co., 572 F. Supp. 236 (Cal. 1983). 
121 Federal Laws Impacting Domestic Partner Benefits, HUMAN RIGHTS 
CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/federal-laws-impacting-domestic-
partner-benefits (last visited Sept. 30, 2014). 
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Schwarzenegger in 2010.122 The final case being, arguably, the 
impetus for the overturning of other similar bans across the country. 
As previously noted, many states across the country have 
allowed for domestic partnership registries, with some governed by 
city ordinance and others by state statute.123 Differences in registries 
also exist in whether or not they allow only same-sex partners, 
opposite-sex partners, or both.124 
The cases previously illustrated show a successive redefining 
of the moral single-mindedness that the Court spoke so definitively 
on the United States having in Reynolds v. United States.125 As the 
court stated, however, in Perry the evolution of the country’s moral 
direction and understanding of gender, identity, and orientation 
should allow for a broader application of domestic partnership laws 
to include polyamorous relationships. 
This discussion will begin with an analysis of Reynolds v. 
United States, calling into question, as did Brown, the discriminatory 
nature of that decision in upholding a bigamy conviction in Utah.126 
“The Supreme Court has over decades assumed a general posture that 
is less inclined to allow majoritarian coercion of unpopular or 
disliked minority groups.”127 In direct contrast, Reynolds went so far 
as to state that “there never has been a time in any State of the Union 
when polygamy has not been an offence against society.”128 Since 
1878 both society and the courts have clearly had a change of 
opinion. 
                                                 
122  See CAL. CONST. art. I § 7.5 (proposed amendment, 2008); see also CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 300(a) (proposed amendment, 2000); In re Marriage Case, 183 P.3d 384 
(Cal. 2008); 
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
123  City and County Domestic Partner Registries, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/city-and-county-
domestic-partner-registries (last visited Sept. 30, 2014); see also Legal Information 
and Resources by State, Unmarried Equality, (last visited February 20, 2015), 
www.unmarried.org/legal-information-resources-by-state/. 
124 See Legal Information and Resources by State, supra note 123. 
125  See generally, Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
126  Brown v. Buhman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (D. Utah 2013). 
127  Id. at 1181. 
128  See Reynolds, 98 U.S  at 145. 
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As mentioned previously, many states, in contrast to city 
ordinances, have same-sex requirements for registering for domestic 
partnership rights.129 This contrast seems likely to be on the brink of 
change as more states legalize same-sex marriage or overturn their 
constitutional bans.130 Our understanding of sexual identity has also 
broadened our understanding of gender identity.131 The same-sex 
and/or opposite-sex requirements seem to be based on a binary that 
is quickly eroding. This binary should be set aside, and a gender 
requirement removed to allow for all relationship pairings, including 
polyamory (which further requires removal of a numerical 
requirement, as discussed below). 
What the Brown court describes as “religious cohabitation” is 
not entirely dissimilar from polyamory, and, for the purposes of this 
discussion, the article will use “polyamory” in lieu of “religious 
cohabitation” in subsequent citing of that case and others. The Brown 
court defined “religious cohabitation” as when “those who choose to 
live together without getting married enter into a personal 
relationship that resembles a marriage in its intimacy but claims no 
legal sanction.”132 This definition is almost entirely equivalent to 
those in polyamorous relationships who live long-term with partners. 
Kory Brown and his wives very carefully asserted the 
fundamental right at stake in their complaint not as a right to be 
polygamists but as “a fundamental liberty interest in choosing to 
cohabit and maintain romantic and spiritual relationships, even if 
those relationships are termed ‘plural marriage’.”133 As the Brown 
                                                 
129  HRC, supra note 153; see also  Unmarried Equality, supra note 124. 
130  Hamm, supra note 16. 
131  See generally The Asexuality Visibility & Education Network, 
ASEXUALITY.ORG, http://www.asexuality.org/home/overview.html ORG (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2014)  (defining “asexual” as “someone who does not experience 
sexual attraction”); see also Intersex Society of North America, ISNA.ORG, 
http://www.isna.org/faq/transgender (last visited Sept. 30, 2014) (defining 
“transsexual” or “transgender” as “people who are born with typical male or female 
anatomies but feel as though they’ve been born into the ‘wrong body;’” also 
defining “intersex” as having “anatomy that is not considered typically male or 
female.”). 
132  Brown v. Buhman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1197 (D. Utah 2013). 
133  Id. at 1198 (emphasis added). 
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court clarified, “plural marriage” would not legally qualify as 
bigamy. Such an interest is directly related to those in polyamorous 
relationships, because the “[polyamorous] relationships fall within 
the fundamental liberty interests given to families and 
relationships.”134 Further, the Brown court states “that ‘it is generally 
understood that the state is not entitled to criminally punish its 
citizens for making such a choice, even if they do so with multiple 
partners.’”135 This very nearly states that polyamory (or some other 
variation of consensual non-monogamy) could arguably be legalized. 
If the court is willing to admit that polyamory is outside the bounds 
of prosecution, because it doesn’t fit the legal definition of bigamy, 
then it is argued that there is not a strong moral disapproval that the 
Reynolds opinion once professed. 
 
VII. Application of the Law & Its Effects 
 
Were a hypothetical polyamorous triad (three persons in a 
polyamorous relationship) to seek domestic partnership benefits 
under any state’s law, they would be denied.136 It would arguably be 
a violation of their “right to be free from government interference in 
matters of consensual sexual privacy.”137 This denial is argued as 
having fewer constitutional rights, as Justice Scalia claims that 
polygamists (and polyamorists by extension) don’t have in his 
dissent in Romer v. Evans, stating that “[p]olygamists, and those who 
have a polygamous ‘orientation,’ have been ‘singled out’ by 
[provisions of previously cited state statutes] for much more severe 
                                                 
134  Lesher, supra note 100 at 143. 
135  Brown, 947 F. Supp. 2d at 1218 (citing State v. Holm, 137 P.3d 726 (Utah 
2006) (Durham, J., dissenting)). 
136  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.20(a)(2014).142.20(a) 
(stating that “[d]omestic partners are two (2) adults . . .”.); see also PHX., ARIZ. 
CODE § 18-401 (2011) (stating that “domestic partnership means two individuals . 
. .”.); 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH, CODE § 2.10.020 (2014) 
 (stating “any two individuals . . .”.). 
137  Brown v. Buhman, 974 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1223 (D. Utah 2013) (citing 
Seegmiller v. Laverkin City, 528 F.3d 762, 771 (10th Cir. 2008)). 
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treatment than merely denial of favored status.”138 As an extension 
of the language in Perry v. Schwarzenegger, in which the courts 
states that there was a “significant symbolic disparity between 
domestic partnership and marriage” and that “domestic partnerships 
are distinct from marriage and do not provide the same social 
meaning as marriage,”139 polyamorous relationships are not afforded 
the privileges of either domestic partnerships or marriage, because 
they have, in fact, been “singled out.”140 Subsequently they would be 
forced to make the undignified choice to pick one of their 
relationships over the other when deciding rights and privileges. The 
majority in the Romer opinion addresses this by stating, “[a] law 
declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of 
citizens then for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a 
denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”141 
This article, and specifically this section, does not seek to 
provide a comprehensive solution to the legal issue of expanding the 
argued rights. There are other articles that speak to this issue.142 This 
section merely provides a simple framework for a solution to a 
complex issue. For the sake of discussion, the legal debate will be 
limited to the city of Minneapolis, Minnesota143 if only because its 
domestic partnership ordinance is favorable to the argument made 
previously.144 To most appropriately further to stated goal of the 
ordinance, the legislature need only strike the “of two (2) non-
married . . . persons.”145 To put this in context, Diana Klein puts forth 
                                                 
138 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (U.S. 1996). 
139  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 994 (N.D. Cal. 2010). 
140  Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (U.S. 1996). (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
141  Id. at 633. 
142  See generally Klein, supra note 23; see also Parkman, supra note 56; 
Strassberg, supra note 153. 
143 MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 142.20(a)(5)-(6) (2014)§ 142; 
accord PHX., ARIZ. CODE §§ 18-400(2011); SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH CODE § 
2.10.020 (2014).; see also CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 770.05 
(2014). 
144  See discussion supra Part III(B). 
145  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES § 142.10 (emphasis added). 
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a few options for a variety of legal arrangements that can be used 
were polyamorous relationships to be afforded some rights.146 
The argument can more broadly be applied to both state 
statutes and city ordinances, with the knowledge that those states 
with a same-sex requirement would need to follow the argument laid 
out in section 5A. Like a number of other states, Minnesota has 
chosen to let city ordinance govern the definition of, and privileges 
granted to, domestic partners. The statutory section entitled “Civil 
Rights and Domestic Partnerships” has seven sections that detail the 
requirements and benefits of the union created by this partnership.147 
Distinguished from most states, which require same-sex 
partnerships, Minneapolis has no gender or orientation requirement 
for partners to enter into the agreement.148 The city has chosen to 
“recognize[] that nationwide debate has advanced an expanded 
concept of familial relationships beyond traditional marital . . . 
relationships.”149 Section 142.20 goes further to require that partners 
“[a]re committed to one another to the same extent as married 
persons are to each other.”150 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
In 1967, the Supreme Court decided that marriage could no 
longer be restricted by race.151 Since that decision, America has 
begun to open its collective mind and adjust its sensibilities to 
understand that, “[l]iberty presumes an autonomy of self that 
includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate 
conduct.”152 This is evidenced by the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear 
the cases regarding same-sex marriage in 2014.153 It seems even 
                                                 
146  See generally Klein, supra note 23. 
147  MINNEAPOLIS, MINN. CODE OF ORDINANCES §§ 142.20(a)(5)-(6)(2014). 
148  Id. 
149  Id. § 142.10. 
150  Id. § 142.20(6). 
151  See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1967). 
152  Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
153  Hamm, supra note 16. 
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more relevant given the same court’s interest in hearing those cases 
in 2015 after more and more states have overturned such bans. 
While marriage might yet be a distant achievement, 
polyamorous relationships deserve dignity, as the Lawrence Court 
defined it, in choosing their partners and, as Perry decided, a level of 
equality in choosing how to protect and have recognized their 
committed relationships, regardless of number. 
 
